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Abstract: Language learning is not primarily driven by a motivation to
describe invariant features of the world, but rather by a strong force to
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536 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5be a part of the social group, which by deﬁnition is not invariant. It is not
sufﬁcient for language to be ﬁt for the speaker’s perceptual motor system.
It must also be ﬁt for social interactions.
Christiansen&Chater’s(C&C’s)targetarticleisaclearandthought-
provoking presentation of the many inconsistencies within and
between various versions of the Universal Grammar (UG) theory.
One of the clearest examples of such inconsistencies, which is
not directly touched upon in this article, is the question of
what happened to the original “poverty of the stimulus” argument
(Chomsky 1980), claiming that language simply cannot be learned
with the ease and speed observed in children without help from a
genetic source. This argument is crucial for upholding any kind of
theoryaboutaUG.Withoutit,thepressureforageneticcomponent
in language disappears. However, cleverly avoiding many of the
earlier inconsistencies, the Minimalist Program (e.g., Hauser et al.
2002) only maintains that rules for recursion are innate, thereby
leaving at least 99.9% of all language content to be learned. This is
paradoxical. Why is this rule impossible to learn, if the rest can be
learned, and vice versa?
We therefore welcome a theory of language which emphasises
the close relationship between linguistic utterances and the
content that they represent (e.g., along the lines of Talmy
2000). The pairing of language and meaning in the brain, in
the most simple case of direct referencing, probably happens
through synchronous ﬁring of auditory and visual cortices
(Hebb 1949). Without prior knowledge to guide understanding,
these activations will probably spread throughout association cor-
tices along the major ﬁbre pathways; and wherever these two
“streams” of information meet, an association is likely to be
encoded. This means that linguistic representations are likely
to be stored in regions overlapping with or contiguous to
perceptuo-motor processing regions (Shallice 1988). Evidence
for this line of thinking has been brought forward in relation to
action words in premotor cortex (e.g., Hauk et al. 2004) and/or
temporal cortex contiguous to V5/MT, a region selective for
visual motion perception (Noppeney 2004; Wallentin et al.
2005), spatial relations in posterior parietal cortex (Mellet et al.
1996; 2002; Wallentin et al. 2006; in press), and perspective
taking in the frontal eye ﬁelds (Wallentin et al. 2008).
With this said, it remains an open question the extent to which
the “cognitive system” is a stable unit, or whether it is also open to
the inﬂuence of language/culture. Even language tied to the
most “basic” cognitive operations, such as spatial processing
(Levinson 2003) and colour detection, shows a wide spectrum
of variation across cultures.
This is not to say that the cognitive system does not constrain
language learning at all, but that cognitive processes are them-
selves subject to the effects of learning. Effectively, what we see
is that both language and the cognitive system adapt to each
other to a certain degree, even in the case of spatial processing
(e.g., Levinson 2003) and colour categorisation (e.g., Gilbert
et al. 2006; Winawer et al. 2007). What results in the case of
colour categories are “near-optimal divisions” of colour space
(Regier et al. 2007). But why not an optimal division? Given
the speed of language evolution and the strong innate bias
towards certain focal colours, due to the anatomy of the
colour-sensitive photoreceptors in the retina (e.g., Bear et al.
2001), why would there be any variation at all? The answer to
this question points towards something crucial in language
learning, namely, that the motivation to learn a language is
probably not primarily driven by a motivation to learn about
invariant features of the world, but rather by a strong force to
b eap a r to ft h es o c i a lg r o u p /society, which by deﬁnition is
not invariant.
When thinking about language as a system that adapts to con-
straints imposed by the brain, it is probably important, therefore,
to distinguish between language evolution directed towards
enhancing ﬁtness in the face of the learner’s perceptuo-motor
system and language evolution directed towards enhancing
language ﬁtness in relation to social dynamics. Where the
former is driven by an optimisation of “rational” perceptual/
linguistic referencing of the exterior world, the social optimis-
ation will mainly be based on social reinforcement markers.
These markers may be proto-linguistic signs, such as facial
expressions, or they may themselves be linguistic utterances,
giving room for a “run-away” effect, known from sexual selection
(Fisher 1999). In other words, socially endowed linguistic
changesmayhappenveryfastandtoacertainextentbeorthogonal
to those imposed by the perceptual/linguistic referencing system.
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